Country: Ukraine

Year: 1991

Head of government: Vitold Pavlovych Fokin

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Nordsieck (2017: 575) identifies Fokin’s party affiliation as KPU (AKA Komunistychna Partiya Ukrainy AKA Communist Party of Ukraine). Political Handbook (2018: 1524) identifies KPU as leftist, stating that “forces on the left continued to be led by the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)”. Aslund (2009: 21-22) confirms Fokin to be a leftist, writing that “Vitaliy Masol, an old-style apparatchik was replaced by Vitold Fokin, who was hardly better as the former chairman of Ukraine’s State Planning Committee”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Fokin’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 780) identifies Fokin’s ideology as leftist, writing that “Vitold Fokin was Ukraine’s former central planning director”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify KPU’s oppose-support market score as approximately 2 and its support-oppose welfare score as approximately 1 on scales from 1-7.

Year: 1992

Head of government: Leonid Danylovych Kuchma

Ideology:

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. World Statesmen (2019) identifies party affiliation as non-party. Although Kuchma received support from the Communist Party in his bid for presidency, Political Handbook (2018: 1517) writes that “Kuchma’s determined pursuit of a market economy was generating strains not only between the president and the PKU-led bloc but also within the mainly centrist political groups that provided the president’s close support”. Lehners et al. (2018) writes that “although it may seem curious that leftists should vote for someone who represented economic reform, Kuchma’s economic platform was vague enough to attract a wide net of supporters”. Kuzio (2014: 47) also writes that “Kuchma, like all other candidates apart from the two radicals, supported a ‘socially oriented economy’” and that “many of Kuchma’s economic policies remained as hazy as did Kravchuk’s”. Kravchuk (2005: 53) writes that Kuchma “ran on a platform of renewed economic ties with Russia and an ‘evolutionary approach’ to reform. He surprised nearly everyone by immediately developing plans for accelerating Ukraine’s transition to the market” and that Kuchma’s proposed program was “comprehensive, embracing the objectives of reducing the budget deficit, stabilizing the currency and introducing the hryvnia, accelerating privatization, liberalizing prices, reducing tax burdens, cutting business regulation, and easing foreign currency restrictions”. However, in early 1995 “Kuchma’s commitment to reform appeared to waiver” and he began “calling instead for the creating of a ‘socially oriented market economy’. He “openly expressed his view that economic reforms should adhere to Ukraine’s unique historical and cultural traditions … and have the following general attributes: 1) Rejection of Western economic models in favor of a ‘state-regulated’ transition to a socially oriented market, 2) Social support of the population during the transition to a market economy, 3) Protection of the domestic market and producers, 4) State price controls.” Birch (2002:340) more explicitly identifies him as rightist, writing that “the right-wing candidates – and Kuchma in particular – stressed the thread of a ‘red revanche’ and the breakup of the country”. Tolpygo (2000: 84), in Table 1, identifies Kuchma as “right-centrist”.

Year: 1993

Head of government: Yukhim Leonidovych Zvyahilsky

Ideology: centre

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. World Statesmen (2019) identifies party affiliation as non-party in 1993. Kuzio (2015: 176) identifies later party affiliation as the Party of Regions, describing him as the “Donetsk ‘Red Director’ Yukhym Zvyahilsky (a long-term Party of Regions deputy)”. DPI identifies PR as centrist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1524) elaborate, writing that “the PR held its initial congress in March 2001 as the culmination of a process that began with the signing of a merger agreement by five centrist parties in July 2000”. Wolchik & Curry (2011: 344) confirm that PR is centrist, writing that “the Party of Regions joined four other pro-Kuchma centrist groups in the Four a United Ukraine bloc (ZYU)”.

Year: 1994

Head of government: Vitalii Andriyovych Masol

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Meleshevich (2007: 69) identifies his ideology as leftist, writing that “at the time of his reappointment, Masol had no party affiliation, although he considered himself ‘a communist at heart’”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Masol’s ideology as leftist.

Year: 1995

Head of government: Yevhen Kyrylovych Marchuk

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Whitmore (2014: 77) identifies Marchuk as a member of Social-Market Choice faction, writing that “Marchuk ‘parachuted’ into the leadership of Social-Market Choice”. Whitmore (2014: 68) further identifies Social-Market Choice as centrist. Darden (2009: 173), however, writes that “state controls were a central feature of the Marchuk economic program, and while critical of both integralist and market liberal tenets, the prime minister reserved particular invective for the latter for calling the retreat of the state from the economic life of the nation. Marchuk criticized the ‘market blitzkrieg, intended to generate and accelerate the self-regulating economic processes by using and demonstrating the laws of a classic market economy’ as ‘premature’ and described monetarist policies as ‘pseudo-market dogma’. He also said that the self-regulating free-market “brought nothing but chaos and destruction to the economy”. In sum, “the Marchuk program focused on using the state to foster economic self-sufficiency and to remove the country from the Soviet division of labor” and emphasized that “Ukraine was unique”, meaning that “general economic theories did not apply to the country, and that the country had to develop its own self-sufficient economy with limited external involvement”. Wilson (2001: 62) writes that “in the 1999 presidential election, the leading centrist and former Ukranian security chief Yevhen Marchuk sought support on both the far right … and among the official trade unions of the left”. Kuzio (2007: 34) writes that “the non-left camp was even more divided, and the only two serious contenders were President Kuchma and former Prime Minister Marchuk”. Tolpygo (2000: 84), in Table 1, identifies Marchuk as “right-centrist”. Birch (2002: 340) identifies Marchuk as rightist, writing that “in the first round, they threw their support behind the popular independent centre-right candidate Yevhen Marchuk (a former prime minister).” Gorchinskaya (1999) writes that “the disintegration of the [Kaniv-4] alliance, which included centrist former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, moderate leftist ex-parliament speaker Oleksandr Moroz, leftist speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko and little known Mayor of Cherkasy Volodymyr Oliynyk, vastly improved incumbent Leonid Kuchma's chances of securing a second five-year presidential term.” Krushelnycky (1999) writes that “Marchuk, who was prime minister for 10 months in 1995 and 96, is seen as pro-Western and pro-market reform. He says he wants to encourage the development of small and medium-sized businesses. He presents himself as the strongest non-leftist option to Kuchma.”

Year: 1996

Head of government: Pavlo Ivanovych Lazarenko

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1529) identifies Lazarenko’s party affiliation as Hromada, writing that the party elected him as “first chair”. Political Handbook (2018: 1529) further identifies Hromada as leftist, writing that Hromada “joined KPU and other leftist groups”.

Years: 1997-1998

Head of government: Valerii Pavlovych Pustovoitenko

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1517) identifies his party affiliation as People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU), writing that “the legislature approved Kuchma’s nomination of Valeriy Pustovoitenko, minister of cabinet of affairs and a member of the People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine (Narodno-Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy– NDPU).” Kuzio (2007: 31) identifies NDPU as centrist, writing that “the NDPU faction was always the smallest of the pro-presidential centrists”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.282) in 1998.

Years: 1999-2000

Head of government: Viktor Andriyovich Yushchenko

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. World Statesmen identifies his party affiliation in 1999 and 2000 as none, and as “Nasha Ukraina”/Our Ukraine starting in 2005. Political Handbook (2018: 1524) identifies Yuschenko as rightist, writing that “the center-right coalesced around former prime minister Viktor Yuschenko and … announced the formation of an electoral bloc, ‘Our Ukraine’” (NU). Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Yushchenko’s ideology as rightist. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify NU’s oppose-support market score as approximately 6.5 and its support-oppose welfare score as approximately 5.5 on scales from 1-7. PartyFacts (2020) codes Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukrayina, OU, from 2005 onward, 8366) separately from the Our Ukraine Bloc (Blok Nasha Ukrayina, NUNS, 2001-2012, 2231) a political alliance which included OU (Yushchenko’s party).

Year: 2001

Head of government: Anatolii Kyrylovych Kinakh

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1530) identifies Kinakh’s party affiliation as the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (Partiya Promyslovciv i Pidpryemtsiv Ukrainy or PPPU), writing that “the PPPU was established by Prime Minister Anatolii Kinakh”. Wolchik & Curry (2011: 344) identify PPPU as centrist, writing that PPPU was one of the four “pro-Kuchma centrist groups in the For a United Ukraine bloc (ZYU)”.

Years: 2002-2004

Head of government: Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1518) identifies Yanukovych’s party affiliation as Party of Regions, writing that “President Kuchma nominated Viktor Yanukovych, the governor of Donetsk province and leader of the recently formed pro-Russian Party of Regions (Partiya Rehioniv - PR)”. CHISOLS dataset identifies PR as “centrist”. World Statesmen identifies PR as centrist, writing “PR = Partiya Regioniv/Partiya Regionov (Party of Regions, regionalist, centrist, pro-Russia, Eurosceptic, 2001-05 pro-Kuchma, 2010-14 pro-Yanukovych”. “Wolchik & Curry (2011: 344) confirm that PR is centrist, writing that “the Party of Regions joined four other pro-Kuchma centrist groups in the For a United Ukraine bloc (ZYU)”. Kuzio and D’Anieri (2014: 78) confirm Yanukovych to be a centrist, writing that “Pustovoitenko was only a passive supporter of the centrist presidential candidate, Yanukovych, in the 2004 election”. Perspective Monde (2019), however, identifies Yanukovych’s ideology as leftist. Kuzio (2012: 564) writes that “Putin and Yanukovych are more similar in the eclectic nature of their leftist and rightist ideologies, merging Soviet-style social paternalism that provides support to Unified Russia and the Party of Regions from former Communist Party voters. The Party of Regions has gone one step further than Unified Russia in drawing the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) into three parliamentary coalitions (2001, when they jointly voted no confidence in the Yushchenko government, 2006–2007 and since 2010).” Kuzio (2005: 62) identifies Yanukovych as centrist, writing that “Centrists like Yanukovych did not support integration with either Russia or the EU and NATO. Integration of whatever type would deprive them of monopolistic power (i.e., sovereignty). The use of pragmatic nationalism to legitimize their rule was clearly seen in the privatization of Kryvorizhstal, Ukraine’s largest steel mill, in June 2004.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.272) in 2006.

Year: 2005

Head of government: Yurii Ivanovych Yekhanurov

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1518) identifies Yekhanurov’s party affiliation as Nasha Ukraina (NU), writing that “Yuschenko nominated Yuriy Yekhanurov, the governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region and a member of the NU, to be the next prime minister”. Political Handbook (2018: 1524) further identifies NU as rightist, writing that “the center-right coalesced around former prime minister Viktor Yuschenko and … announced the formation of an electoral bloc, ‘Our Ukraine’” (NU). Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Yekhanurov’s ideology as rightist. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify NU’s oppose-support market score as approximately 6.5 and its support-oppose welfare score as approximately 5.5 on scales from 1-7.

Year: 2006

Head of government: Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1518) identifies Yanukovych’s party affiliation as Party of Regions, writing that “President Kuchma nominated Viktor Yanukovych, the governor of Donetsk province and leader of the recently formed pro-Russian Party of Regions (Partiya Rehioniv - PR)”. CHISOLS dataset identifies PR as “centrist”. World Statesmen identifies PR as centrist, writing “PR = Partiya Regioniv/Partiya Regionov (Party of Regions, regionalist, centrist, pro-Russia, Eurosceptic, 2001-05 pro-Kuchma, 2010-14 pro-Yanukovych”. Wolchik & Curry (2011: 344) confirm that PR is centrist, writing that “the Party of Regions joined four other pro-Kuchma centrist groups in the For a United Ukraine bloc (ZYU)”. Kuzio and D’Anieri (2014: 78) confirm Yanukovych to be a centrist, writing that “Pustovoitenko was only a passive supporter of the centrist presidential candidate, Yanukovych, in the 2004 election”. Perspective Monde (2019), however, identifies Yanukovych’s ideology as leftist. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.272) in 2006.

Years: 2007-2009

Head of government: Yulia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1517) identifies Tymoshenko’s party affiliation as Fatherland, writing that “cabinet changes included the appointment by Kuchma of three new deputy prime ministers, including Yulia Tymoshenko, a leader of the Fatherland (Batkivschyna) party. Political Handbook (2019: 1525) further identifies Fatherland as leftist, writing that “the social-democratic Fatherland was established as a Supreme Council faction in March 1999 by Yulia Tymoshenko”. Perspective Monde (2019), however, identifies Tymoshenko’s ideology as rightist. Kuzio and D’Anieri (2014: 114) identify Fatherland as centrist. World Statesmen (2019) identifies Fatherland as rightist, writing that the party is “liberal conservative.” Lawson (2010: 100) identifies Fatherland as non-ideological, writing that “Like many electoral coalitions, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko was established several months before the 2002 elections to the Rada. The four constituent members were the centre-right Sobor and Ukrainian Republican Party, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, and Batkivshchyna, with no recognizable ideological leaning”. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 16 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the All-Ukrainian Union Fatherland (BA) as 2.8. Vox Ukraine (2019) identifies Tymoshenko’s ideology as leftist, writing that she has a “social democratic ideology with a strong preference for leftist economic policies”: “Tymoshenko pays a lot of attention to improving the material conditions of Ukrainians: their pensions and medical care, decreasing prices and unemployment, promoting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises”. Kuzio (2013 361) writes: “although a populist, Tymoshenko is therefore different from the left-populist Socialists, who are ideologically opposed to many aspects of economic reform, and therefore have little room for flexibility.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.471) in 2014.

Years: 2010-2013

Head of government: Mykola Yanovych Azarov

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1519) identifies Azarov’s party affiliation as Party of Regions (PR), writing that “Yanukovych named the PR’s Mykola Azarov to head a ‘stability and reforms’ government’”. CHISOLS dataset identifies PR as centrist. Wolchik & Curry (2011: 344) confirm that PR is centrist, writing that “the Party of Regions joined four other pro-Kuchma centrist groups in the For a United Ukraine bloc (ZYU)”. Perspective Monde (2019), however, identifies Azarov’s ideology as leftist. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.259) in 2007 and “Center” (0.112) in 2012.

Years: 2014-2015

Head of government: Arseniy Petrovych Yatsenyuk

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1520) identifies his party affiliation as Fatherland, writing that “with Yanukovych having fled the country, the Supreme Council approved a new cabinet headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a Fatherland leader”. Political Handbook (2019: 1525) further identifies Fatherland as leftist, writing that “the social-democratic Fatherland was established as a Supreme Council faction in March 1999. Perspective Monde (2019), however, identifies Yatsenyuk’s ideology as rightist. Kuzio and D’Anieri (2014: 114) identify Fatherland as centrist. World Statesmen (2019) identifies Fatherland as rightist, writing that the party is “liberal conservative.” Lawson (2010: 100) identifies Fatherland as non-ideological, writing that “Like many electoral coalitions, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko was established several months before the 2002 elections to the Rada. The four constituent members were the centre-right Sobor and Ukrainian Republican Party, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, and Batkivshchyna, with no recognizable ideological leaning”. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 16 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the All-Ukrainian Union Fatherland (BA) as 2.8, left-right salience (0-10) score as 7.5, and divided-united party (0-10) score as 7.3. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.471) in 2014. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s cohesion as “Negligible visible disagreement” in 2014.

Years: 2016-2018

Head of government: Volodymyr Borysovych Groysman

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Nordsieck (2017: 576) identifies his party affiliation as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (BPP). Perspective Monde (2019) identifies BPP’s and Groysman’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 16 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (PPB) as 7.7. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.101) in 2014. DPI has no information for BPP.

Years: 2019

Head of government: Oleksiy Valeriyovych Honcharuk

Ideology: right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. World Statesmen (2020) identifies Honcharuk’s party affiliation as Servant of the People (*Sluha Narodu*, SN). Al Jazeera (2019) identifies Honcharuk as rightist, writing that “Honcharuk, who studied law and public administration before cofounding a law firm at the age of 24, is considered a supporter of liberal economic reforms.” Haring (2019) writes that “[long-time Ukraine watcher Adrian Karatnycky] praised Honcharuk as a ‘respected voice for liberal values, economic discipline, and regulation.’” Lukashova (2019) writes that, in 2018, Honcharuk co-founded a right-liberal NGO “People Matter,” which was eventually meant to become a political party. The group’s manifesto writes that “focus on the economic freedom of citizens and the inviolability of private property makes us supporters of the ideas: liberalization of the economy and the release of entrepreneurial initiative, in particular through deregulation; protection of fair competition, prevention of abuse of monopoly position and reasonable regulation of natural monopolies; privatization of state-owned enterprises, except for strategically important facilities (in particular, critical infrastructure facilities); … reduction of the list of state functions and optimization of the state apparatus, in particular through the introduction of e-government tools; decentralization of power, introduction of real full-fledged and capable local self-government, provided with powers and resources.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.069) in 2019. DPI identifies Servant of the People as centrist.

Years: 2020

Head of government: Denys Anatoliyovych Shmyhal

Ideology: Rightist

Description: Varieties of Democracy identifies party affiliation as “none.” Iwanski and Nieczypor (2020) writes, “[Shmyhal] considers corruption to be the state’s main problem, and sees the fight against it as one of the main tasks of his public activity. He believes that a key tool in reducing corruption is to create conditions for transparent free-market competition, with the state having the smallest possible share in the economy.”

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